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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
eSTATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP ROY SMITH, an infant, 
.by Andrew J. Smith, his Guardian 
Ad Litem, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IGNACI,O THE·ODORE GALLEGOS 
and WASATCH CONSTRU,CTION 
C0~1P ANY, . Case 
Defendants, Third No. 
Party Plaintiffs and 10226 
Appellants, 
,\VILLIAM JEWEL JO.NES and. 
11IL WHITE MUD SALES 
CQjJp ANY, a corporation, 
· Defendants, Third 
Party_ Defendants 
and J-lespondents. 
APP'ELL~~~NTS' BRIEf 
.. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This ac~ion arose out of an accident involving two 
truck-trailer units which .occurred at the intersection 
0£. 3500 South Street and Redwood Road in Salt Lake 
City, Utah . 
. DISPO·SITION IN LOWER COURT 
A b-rief history of this law suit will be helpful. 
One Phillip Roy Smith, a passenger in one of the 
units involved in the accident, commenced the action 
1 
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for persona~ injuries. Named as defendants in the law 
suit were William Jewel Jones, the owner and operator 
of the unit in which Smith was a passenger; Wasatch 
c·onstruction Company, owner of the other unit involved 
in the accident; and Ignacio Theodore Gallegos, the em-
ployee of Wasatch Construction Company who was driv-
ing the unit. Later Smith amended his Complaint joining 
Milwhite Mud Sales as a defendant. This defendant had 
an agreement with William Jewel Jones, the truck owner 
and operator, concerning the carriage of freight which 
was on the unit at the time of the accident. Agency was 
claimed by plaintiff Smith. Each of the defendants \vas 
alleged to have negligently. or willfully caused Smith's 
InJUries. 
Each defendant appeared and answered. Defend-
ants Gallegos and Wasatch Construction ·Company (ap-
pellants herein) cross-claimed against Jones and Mil-
white Mud Sales alleging negligence causing damage to 
the unit and personal injuries to Gallegos. 
Defendant William Je-wel· Jones cross-claimed 
against Gallegos and Wasatch Construction Company 
for personal injuries arid property damage. 
Before the 'case reached trial, the claim of plaintiff 
Smith was settled. Defendants William Jewel Jones, 
Wasatch Construction Company, Theodore Gallegos, and 
Milwhite Mud Sales each contributed to the settlement. 
This left remaining the cross-claims of defendants Theo-
dore Gallegos and Wasatch Construction Company 
against Jones and his cross-claim against them. The 
issues bet,veen these parties were tried to a jury. A 
verdict in favor of Jones resulted. 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF s.o~UGHT· ON APP'EAL 
Appellants Theodore Gallegos and Wasatch rCon ... 
struction Company seek judgment in their favor as a 
matter of law on the cross-claim of William Jewel Jones 
or, that failing, a new trial. 
STAT·E.ME~T OF FACTS 
At ·the. outset, appellants refer the ·Court :to Exhibit 
9, a di~gram of the r<?adway and intersection of 3500 
South anq Redwood Road in Salt Lake City, Utah. For 
convenl.erice, this Exhibit has been reproduced in this 
Brief. The accident in question happened on September 
7, 1961 between 8:00 and 8:30P.M. (R. 291) .. It was dark, 
the road was· dry, the weather was clear, and visibility 
good (R. 318). The unit operated by Theodore Gal~egos 
was northbound on Redwood Road. The unit owned and 
operated by William Jewel Jones was southbound on 
Redvvood Road, turning left intending to proceed east on' 
3500 South. 
At the time of this accident, Redwood Road~'-north 
of 3500-South consisted of four lanes for moving.traffic 
plus a left-turn lane (Exhibit 9). South of· 35'oo: Soi1th 
at the _entrance "to the intersection, Redwood. Road be-
t,veen~curb., lines 'is approximately ·60 feet in width. It 
is sufficiently wide to permit the movement of four cars 
abreast. At ·:the point marked "stop line'' on Exhibit 9, 
the road~vay ~·fro~. the dotted line which·: delineates the 
•. . '• r, • " . '['' ,· , . , 
c11rh .F~~ {-R.- 250) ·to the center line of the road,vay i ~ a 
distance: of 30 feet (Exhibit 9 is scaled 1 inch equals 1 
foot). Following the curb line hack south on the inter-
s-ection, we note that the notthbound lane tapers son1e-
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what and the width of the lane at the edge of Exhibit 
9 is _approximately 17-:-1/2 feet. The tapering of the road-
way can also be seen visually by reference to Exhibit 13 
which is an aerial .photograph of the intersection. Ex-
hibit 13 accurately depicts the roadway at the time of 
the accident with the exception of the moving objects 
shown thereon and there has been added markings de-
scribing the left-turn lane (R. 273 and 274). 
Deputy Sheriff Darrell Brady testified as the first 
witness. He arrived at the scene of the accident about 
8 :30 P.M. and there conducted an investigation. He 
found the point of in1pact between the two units to be 
about 28 feet 6 inches of the survey monument in the 
center of the intersection (R. 219). This point was also 
tied to a water meter cover and a light pole. These marks 
together with the positions of the units after the impact 
are shown on Ex. 9. 
He did not testify as to the statements made by the 
driver, Theodore Gallegos, but he did testify as to state-
ments made by William Jewel Jones. We quote from the 
Record at Page 261: 
"Q. Now will you tell the Court what Mr. Jones 
told you about what happened in the acci-
dent~ 
"A. I believe he told me that he had just come 
through the intersection of - now he wasn't 
familiar with it but I believe he was refer-
ring to 2100 South on Redwood Road which 
at that time still had a semaphore regulating 
traffic for left turn and through traffic for 
all directions. And that while he \vas at the 
4 
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intersection of 35th and Redwood Road when 
the light t-g:rned green he thought it was a 
left turn light for him to go ahead." 
The Deputy Sheriff also obtained a signed statement 
from Mr. Jones which was later introduced into evidence 
as Ex. 23. This statement reads as follows: 
"I, William J. Jones was driving my truck 
.,... ·-' : rsouth on Red,vood Road when I sfopped at 3.3rd 
· South and waited for the light to turn green in 
the center lane for a left turn and when the light 
turned green in the center lane for left . .turns when 
the two' cars that were in front o£ me. turned left, 
I turned left also as all of the lights were still 
red except the center ones and. all of 'the cars 
meeting me were still- stopped w}Je11 this gravel 
truck came out around them on the extreme out-
side lane at a very high rate of speed and hit my 
truck in the right-hand side near the door and 
Phillip Smith who was riding with me was thrown 
out that side \vhen the door was thro\vn open and 
that's just about all that happened. : ,- ,. 
William· .J. Jones 
P. 0. Box 1169 
-~ · Moab, Utah" ..... . .. t.J}: 
.... .,, :•·,•r,.. ,. .. ., 
.. f.·~;, 
t. : '! Contr,ary- to !fr. Jones' belief as to· ther existent~ 
of .:ra , .. signaL· light' :controlling left-turning vehicles, the 
officer~ testified . that at the time of the collis.ion · the 
intersection:·was controlled only by .. a single- semaphore 
which alternately exhibited green, yellow and red signals 
on each of its four sides. There \vas no separate signal 
controlling/left turns (R. 279). 
Additionally the officer testified that the ·point ·o:f 
iinpact on the Jones unit was thP right front fPndPr and 
5 
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door (R. 271), and on the left front corner of the Wasatch 
Construction Company unit (R. 281) .. 
Both drivers testified as to the happening of the ac-
cident. 
Mr. Gallegos testified that he lived in Kearns, Utah 
and was employed by Wasatch ,Construction Company. 
On the evening in question he 'vas hauling dirt fro1n 6000 
South and· 4000 West in Salt Lake County to the Rose 
Park area in the northwest section of the city (R. 304). 
His shift on this day was from 5:00 P.M. to 2:00 A.M. 
i?-1. the morning. He had made one complete trip prior to 
the accident (R. 305). · Mr. Gallegos entered Red,vood 
R:oad at 5400 South and proceeded at a speed of 30 to 
~0 m.p.h. north on Redwood Road to the intersection 
'Yhere the accident happened ( R. 306). (The posted 
speed limit south of the intersection is 40 m.p.h. (R. 
204).) As he proceeded north on Redvvood Road, he was 
following a Pontiac automobile. As that automobile ap-
proached the intersection, it pulled close to the center 
line to make a left turn. He testified that there were 
no other vehicles ahead of the Pontiac as they ap-
proached the intersection (R. 306). The semaphore was 
red against· .him as he approached the intersection, but 
it changed to green when his unit was 200 to 250 feet 
south of the intersection. At a distance of approximately 
150 feet from the intersection, Mr. Gallegos first ob-
served the unit of Mr. Jones. At that time it was moving 
slowly into the left-turn lane to turn left (R. 307-308). 
As the Jones unit turned left across the path of the Gal-
legos unit, Mr. Gallegos stepped on his brakes, turned 
6 
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.to t:Q.e right, and sounded the horn, but there was not 
sufficient time or distance to avoid the resulting collision 
(R.' 308). 
. - Mr. William Jones, driver of the other unit, testi-
fi~d-that -he was a resident of Moab, Utah. He had de-
1ivered a load of furniture to Sunset, Utah from southern 
·ut~ the day before the accident ·and on the- d3:y of the 
accident had_ picked up a 25-ton load of bentonite or drill-
ing mud. -He was sohthbound on. Redwood Road _and a~ 
he approached the intersection of 3500 South, he pulled 
over· into the left-turn lane and commenced signaling 
with the mechanical -signal light on the truck. Ther~ wa_s 
no traffic in the left~ turn lane ahead of him (R. 335 ). 
He testified that as he approached the intersection, the 
traffic light was red against him. He said that there was 
other traffic in the area and that there were cars north~ 
- . 
bound on Redwood Road that were stopp~d. 
He then testified that when the light changed to 
greeri, the veJlicle across from him in the northbound 
lane started to turn left, everything looked cle~r. for hhn, 
so he started to make his left-hand turn. He then glanced 
back in his rear-view mirror to check his trailer to make 
' '-~. , 
sure~- it was clearing the island in the center of the road 
and at that time he was pretty ·.well into· his left turn. 
Wh~n he l_ooked back to the south,: h~ then ,li~s,t' ~bserveg 
the lights. of the_ unit operated by Mr. Gallego_s. ·He only 
had time to hit his brakes and turn the steering wheel 
when the collision occurred (R. 337). At the time of. the 
acci,dent, he had attained a speed of between 5 and 10 
m.p.h.· (R. 338). The other unit was very clpse tp his t1~it 
7 
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when he first observed it and not over.30 feet away (R. 
342). 
Several independent witnesses testified. Mr. Gene 
Matthews was stopped on the west side of 3500 South in 
response to a red light. There was one vehicle ahead of 
him. The driver of this vehicle appeared to be intending 
to turn right to go south _on Redwood Road. Mr. Mat-
thews observed the Jones unit in the left-turn lane either 
stopped or proceeding very slowly into a left turn (R~ 
290). He observed the unit driven by Gallegos just before 
the accident. He estimated the speed at approximately 
25 to .30 m.p.h. and observed this unit turn to the right 
just before· the impact (R. 292-293). 
Marcus Richardson testified that his car \vas stop-
ped on the east ·side of 3500 South headed west. There 
were no cars ahead of him ( R. 317). As he ap-
proached the intersection, the light turned yello\v and 
4e stopped a~ the pedestrian lane in response to the red 
light (R. 318). He observed the Jones unit in the south-
bound left-turn lane stopped. He could not tell-whether 
the left-turn signals_ were operating (R. 318). He heard 
an air horn and his attention was directed to the south 
at which time he observed the Gallegos unit approximate-
ly 175 to 200 feet south of the intersection. At this tilne, 
he observed four northbound vehicles parked along the 
line next to the center waiting for a left turn (R. 322). 
He observed the Gallegos unit pass these vehicles to the 
right and estimated the speed of. the truck at that time 
at 40 to 45 m.p.h. When he looked back, the Jones unit 
was into its left turn (R. 323). The accident happened 
immediately thereafter. 
8 
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~he argument following will be directed to the pro-
position that the Court committed reversible error in 
failing to direct a verdict in their favor as to the negli-
gence of William Jewel Jones. 
AR.GUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ER-
ROR IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT AGAINST WIL-
LIAM JEWEL JONES. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, appellants 
moved the Court to direct a verdict against William Jew-
el Jones and submit to the jury only the question of ap-
pellants' negligence. The motion was denied (R. 364). 
The ·Court should have directed a verdict in accordance 
with the motion and its failure so to do was reversible 
error. 
Specifically Respondent was guilty of negligence as 
a n1atter of la\v in t\vo respects, namely: Failure 
to yield the right of way and improper lookout. Appel-
lants will discuss these two iterns separately. 
A_. Fail1tre to Yield Right of Way 
We look first to the statute of this state governing 
left-turning vehicles. The statute is 41-6-73 UCA 1953 
and reads: 
"The driver of a vehicle within an intersec-
tion intending to turn left shall yield the right 
of way to any vehicle approaching from the op-
posite direction which is within the intersection 
or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate 
hazard, during the time when such driver is mov-
ing \vi thin the intersection. · 
~rhe above section of the Code \vas enacted by thP 
9 
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legislature and "\Vas the law of this state in 1961, prior 
to the accident in question. The enactment of the above 
section was a substantial and material change from the 
prior statute regulating left-turning vehicles. The forn1-
er 41-6-73 u~CA 1953 read as follows: 
"The driver _of a vehicle within an intersec-
tion intending to . turn . to :the left shall yield the 
- right of waY: ;J?., ariy' ve~icle approaching_ from the 
opposite direction whicli" is within the intersection 
or so clos,e thereto as to constitute an iinmediate 
hazard, -btrt i;a-id-~ driver, having so yielded and 
having- gi-\r~n :.a-~ signal wheri ·_ and as required by 
this act, may_ make such left turn and the drivers 
of all othe:r: :yehicles approaching the intersection 
from said oppo~ite, direction shall yield the right 
of way to the vehicle making the left turn." 
The change in statute has bro'adened the responsibil-
ity of the left-turning driver and has placed upon him 
ihe duty to yield the right of way to any approaching 
vehicle that )VOuld constitute a hazard at any tilne the 
left-turning vehicle is in the intersection. The prior 
law provided. only that the left7~prning vehicle must yield 
to any vehicle that was an inim'editae hazard at the time 
th~ left-turning;vehicle commen~e~-his''turn~: -
The factual inquiry that :,no'v 1nust be n1ade in a case 
of this ~ind is _ wh~ther th~- approaching vehicle 'vas a 
hazard du~ing any part of th·e period of tin1e that the 
lyft-turning vehicle 'vould have been 'vithin the inter-
section. The evidence in this case will conclusively show 
that the Wasatch Construction unit "\vas a hazard to the 
tTones unit'. \Yhile it was moving in the intersection. 
Th~ Co)lrt is r~ferred to Exhibit 9. This_ 1nap de-
10 
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lineates the intersection of 3500 South and Redwood 
Road in Salt Lake County and is drawn to scale. De-
picted on the Exhibit are the curb lines or lateral bonn-
dry lines of the roadway and these are marked by ·a 
curved dotted line. As defined by statute, an intersection 
IS: 
"The area embraced within the prolongation 
or connection of the lateral curb lines or, if none, 
then the lateral boundry lines of the roadways 
of the two highways which join one another at, or 
approximately at,· right angles, or the area within 
which vehicles travelling upon different highways 
join at any other angle, come in conflict." 41-6-8 
UCA 1953 
Drawing. an imaginary line representing the pro-
longation of the roadways at the intersection and scaling 
the distance, we note that a left-turn vehicle must trav-
~rse a curve in excess of 60 feet in length in order to 
clear the intersection. To this distance must be added 
the length of the vehicle. This is most important in this 
case because Mr. Jones was operating a heavily loaded 
truck-trailer unit. -These vehicles as is commonly known 
vary from 35 to 55 feet in length. To clear this particular 
intersection then, the Jones unit would necessarily have to 
travel a curve of a minimum distance of 95 feet in order 
to clear the intersection. This minimum figure is arrived 
at by adding the minimum length of the unit to the 
minimum distance on the ground. In other words, froin 
the moment the front of the unit enters the intersection 
till the end of the trailer leaves it, a minin1um distance 
of 95 feet is involved. 
Coupled with the distances involved is the ti1ne 
11 
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that it takes for a vehicle to travel this distance and this 
factor is. dependent upon its speed. In this case Mr. 
Jones testified as to the speed of his vehicle : 
"Q. Will you tell us what your speed was as you 
proceeded in your turn and at the time of the 
accident~ 
A. Somewheres between 5 and 10 miles an hour." 
(R. 338) 
At 5 miles per. hour a vehicle will travel 7.3 feet per sec-
ond and at 10 miles per hour a vehicle will travel 14.66 
feet per second. It will be noted that it would take ap-
proximately 6.4 seconds for the Jones unit to clear the 
intersection at 10 miles per hour and 12.9 seconds at 5 
miles per ·hour. It may be reasoned that by his own· esti-
mate of speed as being "somewheres between 5 and 10 
miles an hour'' it would have taken him approximately 
9 seconds to clear the intersection. This time is some-
thing he should have anticipated 'vhen he commenced his 
left turn. The posted speed limit at this intersection 
is 40 m.p.h. (R. 204). A vehicle approaching the inter-
section at that speed would be travelling approximately 
58 feet per second. During the approximate nine-second 
interval required by ·the Jones unit to clear the intersec-
tion, an approaching vehicle travelling 40 miles an hour 
would cover approximately 500 feet. It may, therefore, 
b~ co~cluded that at. the time the Jones unit started its 
turn any approaching vehicle within 500 feet of the inter-
section would constitute a potential hazard. 
Now let us look at the event of this accident with par-
ticular regard to the time, speed and distances involved. 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Again we refer to Exhibit. 9 and scale off the distance 
between the entrance to the intersection and the actual 
point on the roadway where the two trucks collided. We 
find this to be approximately 45 feet on a straight line. 
In this case nothing would be added to this distance for 
the· length of the vehicle because the point of impact 
on the Jones unit was the right front (Ex. 11 -photo-
graph). Considering the speed of the Jones unit at be-
tween 5 and 10 miles per hour, it "\vould have taken that 
unit between three and a half to 7 seconds to travel the 
distance from the entrance to the intersection to the 
point of impact 50 feet away. Assuming that the Jones 
unit was traveling 10 miles per hour, any approaching 
vehicle traveling 40 m.p.h. would have collided "\vith the 
Jones unit if the approaching vehicle were within ap-
proximately 400 feet of the point of impact travelling 
at a speed of 40 m.p.h. 
These figures furthermore did not show the mere 
possibility of a collision as the Jones unit was almost clear 
of the intersection. These figures show a collision occur-
ring at almost the first possible moment that such colli-
sion could occur. That is, at the moment the front of the 
Jones vehicle had only just entered the lane of traffic 
occupied by the Wasatch ·Construction unit. 
We now refer to the testimony of Mr. l\iarcus F~ 
Richardson. l-Ie was stopped waiting for a red light on 
the east side of 3500 South facjng west. He could ob-
serve both the Jones unit commencing its left turn and 
the. approaching Wasatch Construction Company unit. 
Called as a witness by Mr. ,Jones he testified that he 
13 
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observed the Wasatch Construction unit approximately 
175 to 200 feet south of the intersection (R. 318) and that 
he estimated· the· speed of the vehicle at that time at 40 
to 45 m.p.h. At that moment the Jones unit had com-
menced its left turn. Mr. Richardson kne\v there was 
going to be an accident and testified, "I told my wife 
-there was going to __ be. an accident ... " (R. 319'). This 
witness shows that· at the time the Jones vehicle com-
menced its left turn, ;the Wasatch Construction unit was 
only 175 to 200 feet from the intersection travelling at a 
rate of 40 to 45 m.p.h. The mathematics applicable to 
the testimony of ·this· witness shows that· the Wasatch 
·Construction unit would enter the intersection within 
3% seconds. It is abundantly clear that this unit was an 
immediate hazard to Respondent Jones requiring him 
to yield· th.e right of way. It is also apparent that it is 
not conceivable that reasonable minds could disagree. The 
lower court, therefore, should have directed a verdict 
against Mr. Jones on this point alone. 
We turn no\v to the law. As noted above, the legis-
lature has made a significant change in the statute gov-
erning left tn,rns. The legislature has "tightened up" 
the law in this regard and placed a greater duty on the 
left-turning motorist. That motorist is nO\V and was at 
the time of this accident required. to yield the right of 
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direc-
tion which is so close· as to constitute an immediate haz-
ard during any time that the left-turning driver is mov-
ing within the intersection. T·o the best knowledge of 
app.ellants this statute has not been before this Court 
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for judicial interpretation. However, it is apparent from 
reading the statute that the change is of such magnitude 
to make the cases interpreting the earlier · statute no 
longer sufficient authority. The law must be restated 
in terms _of the new statute. Appellants contend that a 
statement from WALKER VS. PE1'ERSON, 3 Utah 
2d 354, 278 P. 2d 291 is- pertinent in this regard. This 
Court said: 
"The driver going straight through the inter-
section does have the right of way. This means 
that where the circumstances are such that if 
the two continued their course, there would be 
danger of collision, the left turner must give 
way.'' 
The statute means that if in any accident involving 
a left turner it can reasonably be said that the approach-
ing vehicle would be a danger if the two vehicles con-
tinued on their course, then the left turning driver is 
guilty of failing to yield the right of way barring his 
recovery as a matter of law. For cases concerning the 
early statute, see CEDERLOF VS. vVHITED, 110 l~tah-
45, 169 P. 2d 777; FREN·CH VS. UTAH OIL REFINING 
COMPANY, 117 Utah 406,216 P. 2d 1002; YEATES 'lS. 
BUDGE, 122 Utah 517,252 P. 2d 220. 
B. FAIL1TRE TO i\lAINTAIN A PROPER. 
LOOKOUT. 
Closely coupled with respondent's failure to yiPld 
the right of way is his failure to maintain a proper look-
out. His testimony in this regard is most illuminating. 
He gives his version of the events immediately before 
the accident i11 the following manner: _ 
"A. Well, when the light changed to green thP 
15 
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car that was sitting at an angle started to 
make a turn to the west, this was the left 
hand turn for it and I checked and everything 
was clear as far as I could see. I started my 
left hand turn and I glanced back in my mir-
ror, my rear-view mirror on the left to check 
my trailer to ~~e if it was ~learing the island 
in the center and at that time I was pretty 
well in my turn. I was pretty well across 
Redwood Road into the other road going 
east, that would be 3500.- And when I looked 
back why those lights to the extreme east 
of the road, to my· south, was bearing down 
on me.'' (R. 336~337) 
' Respondent by this -testimony admits that his at-· 
tention was directed to the mirror on his left to deter-
mine whether or not his trailer was clearing the island 
in the center of the road. His duty was to maintain a 
con~i:quing lookout for vehicles approaching. _ 
Respondent even gives us the reason for his failure 
to maintain a lookout. At the time he stopped in re-
sponse to the red semaphore, he was under the in1pres-
sion that this intersection had a green light for left-
turning traffic ~d that when the,green light was on for 
left-turni,ng traffic, red lights .. _.c_o:nttolled through traffic 
so as to permit the _left turn. In this regard, we refer 
to the statement he gave the officer which is quoted above 
(Ex. 23). 
Again, it was the duty of respondent to maintain 
a continuing lookout. WEENIG BROS. \'"S. MA:NNING, 
1 Utah 2d 101, 262 P. 2d 491. Had the attention of Re-
spondent been directed ahead for approaching traffic 
rather than to the left-side rear-vi~w mirror 'vhere it \Yas · 
16 
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directed, he would have been apprised of the approach-
ing vehicle of appellant and had sufficient and ample 
time to have avoided the accident. 
We first call the attention of the ·Court to the fact 
that these were two truck-trailer units. The cab of each 
is considerably higher than an ordinary passenger car 
and affords the driver a much better view of his sur-
roundings and moving traffic. Also to be noted is the 
fact that respondent's vehicle was occupying a position 
on the roadway that it had a legal right to occupy~ Ref-
erence is made to respondent's Ex. 13 which is an aerial 
photograph of the intersection in question. There have 
been no changes made to the roadway in question as to 
dimension, but there has been added since the time of 
the accident a lane marked "left only." It is quite appar-
ent by reference to this photograph that there is suffi-
cient roadway for two lanes of moving traffic going 
north. This is also apparent by reference to the map 
(Ex. 9). All witnesses also testify to the fact that the 
vehicles next to the center lane going north were waiting 
or making left turns. Title 41-6-56 UCA 1953 pern1its 
passage on the right under these circumstances. We also 
mention that the roadway north of this intersection is 
marked for four moving lanes of traffic and a vehicle in 
the position of respondent's vehicle is almost directly 
in line with the outside of the two north-bound lanes (Ex. 
9 and 13). 
We note from further reference to Ex. 9 that the 
point of collision was approximately 28 feet 6 inches 
east of the center of the intersection. We also know that 
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the vehicle of. respondent· started :from . a stopped position 
and had attained a speed of. 5 to'lO m.p.h. when the .acci-
dent occurred. According·- to.:: Mr. Jones'.· testimony a 
vehicle such as his _ w!te~~.~-~~e j ~rakes are fully _applied 
will either stop or the wheels lock an~ ~kid (R-. ~30). He 
had time to apply his brak~s he(or;_~ t_~e~impact._.(R_. 337), 
~nd stopped-.l~is. ve_~icle before .. _t~e ·-~~pa~t ·,occurred (R. 
?4~). His truck di~;}:.t<?.t leave ski~- marks in the process 
of stopping. (R. 339). 
T4ese facts and testimony . .serve to point out that 
respondent could have stopped higt vehicle without skid .. 
ding. at any point in the intersection fro:in the_;moment he 
commenced his left7hand turn and particulaxly during the 
last 28feet that he wa.s crossirig·opposing lanes of traffic. 
Mr. Jones testified that appellants' vehicle was only 
·~>-- . . 
30 feet from his· vehicle when he first observed it (R 343-
346). ·. He had not seen nor· was he aware of appellants' 
vehi~le u~til th~ two vehi~les were that close togethe~. 
There is no evidence in th'e record that his view to the 
south-was· in any~man!J.er_obstr~~ted. He giv~s no reason 
for failing to see the app~:ro'adhing ·vehicle of appellant. 
. . .. . .r . .· !1'_ . : 
Responde:ilt's own witne§s/-~Iatcus Richardson, heard 
~ ~ . .• ' I 
the air horn of appellants;_ =vehi'cle, 1ooked i:h~ih_at di,re~ 
tion and saw the vehicle, and at. the. sa1ne moliierit kneW' 
and realized that the left-turning vehicle of~-respon~~nt 
was on a collision course. There is· no evidence or testi-
mony in this record to show why respondent was nofalso 
aware of these facts and circumstances. It is,:·jhowever, 
apparent from the record that the r.eason why respondent 
did not become a'vare of these.' facts is that he _thought 
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·he h.ad a left~turn sigruil an<;l for .that :reason .. was not 
maintaining a lookout for approaching vehicles, but 
rather was looking in his left-side view mirror to keep 
track of his trailer. This excuse is nof sufficient. His 
duty under· settled law was· to maintain a continuing 
lookout for approaching vehicles. 
If respondent had maintained a proper .lookout, 
.he could have stopped his v:ehicle in tin1e to have avoided 
the accident. This is clear from his testimony regarding 
the fact that he fully stopped his vehicle withol!t skidding 
·when appellants' vehicle was only 30 feet from his truck. 
At his speed of from 5 to 10 m.p.h., it is quite obvious 
that he could have avoided the accident' almost at any 
time before the accident actually happened. 
The case of JOHNSON VS. SYME, 6 Utah ~d 319, 
313 P. 2d 498 is applicable to the facts of this case. 
The accident in this case occurred at night on a four-
lane highway divided by a 35 foot island bordered by 
open farm land. The accident occurred on U.S. 91 at its 
intersection with the Draper road. The facts indicated 
that the defendant drove into the highway without stop-
ping for a stop sign. Plaintiff admitted that she saw 
nothing until defendant's car was directly in front of her 
at a distance of 20 to 30 feet. Plaintiff's own witnesses 
·,vho were travelling behind her vehicle testified that 
.they observed the whole occurrence including the defPnd-
ant's vehicle approaching the high,vay. 
The Court held: 
"Under such circun1stanePs \\TP cannot hut 
conclude that plaintiff either looked and failPd 
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to'. see the obvious, or failed to look at all, -and 
~s a matte.~ 9f law negligently contributed to her 
own injuries and the death of another motorist. 
. In. other. instances of negligent failure_ to look 
· or to see that which is there ·to be seen, when· the 
.· ._· facts were no stronger than th.ose herein, we ·have 
concluded, as w_e. do here, that there . was con-
tributory negligence as a ma.tter of law which 
. : · p·recluded recovery." · · 
' The. ';Court above- cites a~~. ;refers to the following 
'Utah ca~es wherein the failure to" ;maintain a p~oper 
.lookout.·was deemed to be negligenc~--as a matter of law: 
·- -; ~ . . 
:sANT VS. 1\~I~LER,· 115 Ut~h 559, ·206 P. 2d 719·; 
CEDERL~OF V.:~· .WHI~ED., 110-.Utah 45, 169 P. 2d 777; 
MINGUS VS." <?L~_§Q~,_.114 Ut,ah 505, 201 P. 2d 49·5; 
COX VS·. THOMPS.ON, · 123 Utah "81, 254 P. 2d 1047; 
-WILKINS·ON V. 0
1REGO:N. s.HO·RT L. R. ·C'011P ANY, 
35 Utah 110, 99 P .. 40:6; COVINGTON V. CARP·ENTER, 
4.-Uta.h 2d H7:8, 294 P'.2d 788. _ 
..,.,~ ;·~Where, as in this case, a driver has obviously failed 
to maintain a 1ookout for approaching traffic, this· Court 
has ·not hesitated to rule that such motorist is guilty of 
negligence as a· matter of law· barring recovery. 
:· ... ~. 
,-: .. :. 
·CONCLUSION 
The. evidence in this case points unerringly and ~s a 
matte·r of htw to the conclusion that respondent, William 
.. . . - \ - . 
Jewel Jones, failed to yield the right of way to the ap-
proaching vehicle of appellant and that he faile~:• as ·a 
matter of law to maintain a proper lookout. ~- ~- ::·,. ,;; 
The facts in the case without dispute show.. that re-
- , ., , .•• II 
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spondent, William Jewel Jones, commenced a left turn 
at a time when the vehicle of appellant was an immediate 
hazard. He failed to yield the right of way as command-
ed by the statute and this failure as a matter of law caused 
the accident. 
Additionally, the evidence is without dispute that he 
did not see the vehicle of appellant until that vehicle was 
30 feet from his vehicle. His own witness testified that 
he heard the air horn of appellants' vehicle, saw the same 
when it was 175 feet to 200 feet away, observed the left-
turning vehicle of respondent, and knew there would be 
a collision. Respondent offered no evidence at all as 
to why he failed to see and hear the same things and to 
take heed. He testified that he did not see the vehicle 
of appellant until it was 30 feet away. This clearly as a 
matter of law convicts him of a failure to maintain a 
proper lookout. 
The verdict below must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
I 
I 
I 
/ 
EJEELINL:. 
6A.S 
SIG':7 / 
® .II 
_,., 
--
v 
I 
I 
I 
v.a., __ 
GAS 
L.IGHT 
PO'-E. 
--------· ~~! §II 
I( I 
-------~ 
L.ANI!. 
L.ovF.. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAI/lNG ~ 
~ 
=====================- -~--===-~-_-__:::_-__ ---=---~-
~ 
:~ -LEFT TliR~ L.AN£.-
~ IC~------------------~~~~~,S~E~D~~~~E~DI~A~N~~/~S·LA~~~/~~ 
.~I=======-
'~ 
I SIGN 
SINCLAIR 
GAS 
e ,-POLE 
~PAl/Eo/. 
-PLAN LJi,: 
~EOWOO.D RO. 
SCAL 
.liY W. Y. TIPTON P. E. A I..S. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
= 
U-68 
4CRAM-
& .35 00 80 . .sr. 
: IH=/0' 
3/9 ocr. 12, 19sz 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
----
------
~ELJW'OO.O ROA.D 
\\-------,.._1 
---------
n OLD HICKORY ij 
CAr.e: st&N-- ~ 
PARKING /!ReA _...... 
/ 
'\ 
ASPHALT P,4V'/NG 
.. sroRES 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
